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THE ARMY;

Its Employment During Time of Peace, and the Necessity for Its Increase.

BY

Major GEORGE S. WILSON,

Assistant Adjutant General,

U. S. A.

PRIZE ESSAY FOR 1896.

BOARD OF AWARD:

Hon. C. F. Manderson, Hon. Theodore Roosevelt,

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THE ARMY; ITS EMPLOYMENT DURING TIME OF PEACE, AND THE NECESSITY FOR ITS INCREASE.

By Major GEORGE S. WILSON, Assistant Adjutant General.

"There is a rank due the United States among nations, which will be withheld, if not absolutely lost, by a reputation of weakness. If we desire peace, one of the most powerful instruments in our rising prosperity, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war."—Washington.

THE MAINTENANCE OF A STANDING ARMY.

A FUNDAMENTAL principle of self-government lastingly grounded in the minds of the American people forbids the maintenance of a standing army of strength to warrant thought of danger therefrom to liberty and free institutions. Another limitation is a business one, founded on our geographical and political separation from the great armed powers of the world. We reason that because of this isolated situation war with a formidable power is improbable, and even should we become engaged in one, large hostile armies could not be transported to our shores, and therefore it would be useless expense to maintain a large force to meet a possible but doubtful contingency, which, even did it occur, would be no serious matter any way.

On the other hand there has been no time since the formation of the Government one hundred and six years ago, when we have not believed it to be in the best interest of sound governmental policy to maintain, and we have maintained, a small military force called the Regular Army; proportioned to what has been deemed necessary to meet internal police purposes, and to serve as a living exponent and nucleus of latent military power existing in our militia, to be called into activity at the cry of war. The proper size of this Regular Army will come up for discussion further on.

THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARMY IN TIME OF PEACE.

What in a legal sense distinguishes "time of peace" from "time of war," the gradations and distinctions between riot, insurrection and rebellion, and kindred questions are matters of no interest in this discussion, the aim of which is to treat of the proper size and most profitable future employment of the Army when it shall not be engaged in warfare. Broadly speaking we will define peace to mean the absence of war, and war to mean

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warfare against foreign powers or against organized and formidable rebellion. And here it may as well be said that technical and legal points and definitions concerning the Army in its existence, organization or employment, will not be argued. It will be assumed that the Army is to continue to exist and to be organized and employed under the authority of the Constitution and the laws of Congress.

Beginning with the formation of the Government under the Constitution in 1789, at which time the Army consisted of 672 officers and men, the country has enjoyed peace periods as follows: from 1789 to 1812 (War with Great Britain)—22 years; from February, 1815, to April, 1846 (Mexican War)—31 years and two months; from July, 1848, to April, 1861 (War of the Rebellion)—12 years and 10 months; from August, 1865, to the present time, 30 years. That is, of our one hundred and six years of national life, ninety-six have been devoted to peace and ten to war. But in this exhibit no account is taken of the war (?) with France in the latter part of the last century, and the war with Tripoli in the beginning of this, in neither of which was the Army engaged. Our numerous Indian troubles are also excluded, although many of them, if judged from a physical point of view, could properly be classed as wars of no little magnitude.

The first employment of moment of an armed force in executing the laws other than against Indians is found in connection with the celebrated Whiskey Riots in Western Pennsylvania, in 1794. This insurrection began in the forcible resistance to the collection of an excise tax. Indictments had been found against a number of distillers for violation of federal law, and warrants placed in the hands of a United States marshal for service. In attempting to serve these warrants the marshal and revenue officers were forcibly resisted by armed men, and the local militia was called upon for aid, but refused to act. A detachment of eleven regulars was then obtained from the small garrison of Fort Pitt with which the marshal and his party took refuge in a house, where they were attacked by five hundred armed men and compelled to surrender. Disaffection rapidly spread throughout Western Pennsylvania and a part of Maryland and Virginia, so that by August no less than seven thousand armed insurgents had assembled at Parkinson's Ferry, near Pittsburg, and they counted upon an ultimate force of fifteen or sixteen thousand. In the meantime President Washington, having first obtained a certificate of a judge of

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the Supreme Court "that in the counties of Washington and Alleghany the execution of the laws was obstructed by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by ordinary course of judicial proceedings," called out from the States of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia fifteen thousand militia. The militia responded, and Gov. Lee, of Virginia, was placed in immediate command of the expedition; but Washington himself exercised chief direction, even accompanying the troops as far as Carlisle. This force reached Parkinson's Ferry November eighth, and soon thereafter the insurrection collapsed. At that period such regular force as existed was engaged against Indians in the Northwest.

Passing by such minor employment as was from time to time made of troops in assisting the civil authorities in the execution of the laws we next come to the use made of the Army in the troubles in Kansas and at Harper's Ferry during the Buchanan Administration. Of this turbulent period little need be said. Although occurring in time of peace, the Kansas troubles and poor old John Brown's fanatical exploit of treason on the "sacred soil of Virginia," and within the walls of a United States building, were really the advance skirmishes wherein was shed the first blood in that mighty conflict of arms which was to decide whether the Constitution makers had really constructed an enduring temple of liberty, or had only put together a beautiful house without nails, that it might be taken down and its separate parts carried off at the individual will of any of its occupants. So of the employment of the Army in reconstruction duty. It was the aftermath of the great conflict, inseparably connected with it. The conditions under which the service was rendered, and its nature, were not connected with the ordinary problems of government, were without precedent, and, let us hope, are never to be repeated. Of that period it is only necessary here to say that, from first to last, the Army had a delicate and responsible duty to perform, which it executed faithfully, temperately and wisely.

The Utah Expedition of 1857-58, in which about twenty-five hundred regular troops were employed to suppress open and defiant rebellion of the Mormon population of that distant country, hardly rose to the dignity of war. Yet the magnitude of the expedition and the extraordinary and serious nature of the conditions in Utah which demanded it, were such as to raise its nature

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above that of the ordinary employment of troops in executing the laws in time of peace.

The next important employment of the Army in assisting civil authority to execute the laws is found in connection with labor and strike riots, first in 1877, and again in 1894. In 1877 the riots, with their central force in Pennsylvania, spread over ten States of the Union, paralyzing business and subverting law and order throughout from the Hudson to the Mississippi. State and municipal governments were confessedly powerless to protect life and property, and by requisition of State governors federal aid was invoked and regular troops sent to the various scenes of violence. The troops soon succeeded in restoring law and order.

The memorable strike riots of 1894 were still more widespread, reaching as they did two-thirds of the way from one ocean to the other; and considering the organized source from which they emanated and were directed, they were also of a more serious and alarming character. Chicago was the point of greatest danger, but at over fifty other places violence took place or was threatened, and only prevented by the timely intervention of troops. Again the Army was called upon in the interests of law and order, and again it performed its mission to the satisfaction of the people. From first to last, over one hundred and fifty companies of cavalry, artillery and infantry, and about four hundred sailors and marines, were employed to suppress these riots; a force deplorably disproportionate to the number of the law breakers, and yet equal to nearly one-half of the available force of the United States Army.

The Army's century of Indian service may be classed as regular warfare or as police duty, to suit the fancy. As a matter of fact, it was hard service, fraught with sanguinary engagements, great casualties, and untold hardships; and often, as in the earlier campaigns in the then North-west, the Florida wars, and some of the more recent campaigns, large forces of troops were engaged against formidable numbers of Indians. Surely many of these campaigns have been bloody wars. But for all this, these wars, so far as they themselves affected the status, were carried on "in time of peace." The conditions which entailed all this trouble with the Indians were anomalous, growing out of the presence with us of a savage race, who until very recent years forcibly disputed our right to this country; and yet

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who were so weak in numbers, so scattered territorially, and so lacking in political autonomy that we could not properly regard them in other light than as an aggregation of troublesome savages over whom we had a right to exercise control. But the Indians have at last given up the struggle and acknowledged our supremacy; and the "anomalous conditions" and the occupation of the Army growing out of them are, or very soon will be, things of the past.

In this retrospect it has been the aim to bring to mind such notable instances of the employment of the Army in time of peace as are believed to have been of immediate vital service to society, and also to have exercised a lasting influence on the policy to be pursued concerning the Army's share of work in the future duties of the executive department of the Government in "taking care that the laws be faithfully executed."

Speaking in general terms, the Regular Army exists for a two-fold purpose: First, as a plant for the formation of armies out of the raw material to meet possible international warfare or organized rebellion: and second, as a national police force complete in itself, to aid the civil authority in executing the laws when "obstructed by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by ordinary course of judicial proceedings."

As we have seen there have been at least three instances of the services of the Army in connection with the civil authority in rescuing society from the thraldom of mob violence and upholding the supremacy and dignity of national authority. Had other than a Washington been President at the time fifteen thousand men were gathering and arming west of the Alleghanies with insurrectionary intent, what would have been the destiny of this country? At that time the Government had but recently emerged victorious from a war of revolt against a strong government which had oppressed it, the patriotism of the Revolution had not had time to fully crystallize around the national idea, and open talk of a Western Confederacy soon thereafter lured Aaron Burr on to treason. Patriot and far-seeing statesman that he was, Washington promptly took fifteen thousand soldiers from a poverty stricken population of five millions, and not a man too many or a day too soon to nip the incipient rebellion in the bud. It is true the force used by Washington was necessarily militia, for there was no regular army to meet the emergency, but nevertheless it was the use of organized military power wielded by the

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Federal Government. The labor riots of 1877 gave the country experience on a large scale of a comparatively new source of trouble. They were less serious than the Whiskey Riots, as they scarcely could be said to threaten the integrity of the Government, but they were forerunners of dangers of a different nature, and ones which we will have to confront in the future. The Regular Army suppressed these troubles.

And now we come down to the great strike troubles of 1894. Concerted strikes controlled by powerful organizations suddenly brought tens of thousands of able bodied men first into idleness, next into unlawful interference with the rights of others, and finally into open, defiant and violent opposition to the laws of the land. These riots also were suppressed by the Regular Army; and again it is interesting to speculate in our minds as to how else, or at what cost of life and treasure they could have been overcome. Our faith in the stability of Anglo-Saxon free institutions is too great to admit doubt as to the final outcome. And yet how near we were to insurrection and bloody scenes of the most revolting nature that could afflict a civilized people! Bloodshed and destruction were present, anarchy and chaos in sight. Speaking of this crisis (September, 1894, *Forum*), Judge Cooley says:

"When interstate commerce was interrupted, * * * President Cleveland sent to Chicago, the point of greatest disturbance and disorder, a considerable military force to aid the civil officers, and to protect the carriers of the mails and the persons and vehicles employed in interstate transportation while they continued or made efforts to continue in the performance of the customary service. This at once brought out a protest from the Governor of Illinois, who insisted that the President was encroaching upon the rights of the State. * * * Governors of some other States were understood to concur in this view. When the President replied to the protest that the United States troops were sent into the States only to enforce national laws * * * the reply was treated as insufficient, the protest was repeated from time to time, and the consequent excitement tended to keep the disorderly elements bold and defiant, so that the demand was even made by some of them that the governor should employ the military power of the State to remove the federal force.

* * * * * * * * * "But the position of the governor was that the main-

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tenance of peace and the repression of disorder was a State duty, and the President was consequently guilty of usurpation when he thus without request moved troops into the State for the purpose.

"We cannot admit that the position taken is even plausible. It has no warrant whatever in the federal constitution, which, on the contrary, is distinctly against it."

* * * * * *

The position here taken by Judge Cooley is fully concurred in by the country at large as well as by the constitutional lawyers, and the use of the military arm by the Chief Executive to aid in "taking care that the laws be faithfully executed" has, by Mr. Cleveland's action in 1894, become a fixed policy of the Government. And it is predicted that the elements of discord which have caused these domestic disturbances are with us to stay, any way for a generation or so, and the future will bring forth many painful occasions for the use of the Army as a police force.

We also need an army as a partial preparation for war; and while we will never maintain a military peace establishment adequate to meet the demands of a conflict with even our weakest neighbor, we should maintain a force sufficient to serve as a basis for such an army, and which should keep alive the military spirit and knowledge. But we sometimes hear it said: "Why should we keep an army? War is barbarism, and arbitration has taken its place." Again, it is held that we are a people to ourselves, that the ocean separates us from complications and wars, and so on to the end of the argument. War *is* barbarism, and it is to be hoped arbitration will supplant it. But wars are not ended; arbitration is in its infancy, and so refined a child of civilization may have many set-backs, and at best is of slow growth. In the old sailing days the oceans *did* separate us from the other nations by ten to twenty weeks; now they separate us by ten to twenty days for army transports, and by five or six days by passenger ships. And our policy of non-intervention in the affairs of others, even if we maintain it (which we are not likely to do) is one sided. It binds no one not to interfere with us. But the uses and necessities for an army will come up for further discussion in succeeding pages.

The employment of the Army in time of peace may for convenience be discussed under two heads; first, its employment as a police force or for other special purposes under orders ema-

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nating from the President; and second, its occupation and daily life when not so engaged. It is the last named employment we will now consider, and it also may be divided under two heads. First, its internal duties and occupations incident to its existence as a complete organization, and second, its duties as a disseminator of military knowledge and training among the people as a preparation for war. It is conceded that we will never maintain a large army, but that we will keep a small one. In this view it is plain that it becomes all the more important that our Army should employ itself in acquiring and maintaining the highest type of perfection known to military bodies. To properly discuss this subject would involve going into questions of organization and administration to a degree foreign to this paper, but in a general way it is proper to say that the personnel, organization, equipment, supply and administration of the Army should be such as to insure to the service the highest obtainable standard of excellence. Discipline should be as a rod of iron. It may seem hopelessly illogical to claim that the army of a free people needs to be kept in stricter discipline than any other army, with wider space between the officers and enlisted men, yet there are natural reasons why it should be so. The armies of Europe are drawn from people who for countless generations have lived under monarchical institutions and class government where every man is born and bred to pay homage to some other man, and the habit of subordination to the will of another is a matter of heredity. It is natural that when such a man finds himself in the army he is not only amenable to discipline, but any relaxation on the part of the officer would be accepted as a matter of grace. With us these conditions are reversed. Every man is born and bred in the idea of equality, and means of discipline are entirely artificial productions of law, not only without support from traditional habit, but they have that habit to overcome; and familiarity on the part of the officer would breed contempt of authority. But the state of discipline in the Regular Army has an influence for good or evil beyond its mere application where enforced. It becomes the standard of measure of obtainable discipline among the militia and volunteers when called into service, and while it is not expected that the citizen soldiery should come under the rigid discipline of regulars, the nearer they can be brought to it the more efficient would be the Army. Now, no matter what the standard of discipline in the Regular Army the citizen

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soldiery would attain the same relative approach to it whether it be high or low.

The sea-coast defenses of the country, and the duties of the Ordnance Department in supplying proper armament for them, as well as in making provision for arming and equipping armies for war purposes, are of vital and immediate importance, but do not come within the province of this paper.

The duty of the Army as a disseminator of military knowledge is more important than would at first appear. Its importance as well as its necessity grows out of the smallness of the Army, and the need that it be kept at a high standard of perfection that it may be a model and a teacher. It is sometimes claimed that an efficient National Guard would obviate the necessity for a standing army. That could never be, for without the Army as a central model and inspiration the National Guard could not be efficient. As well talk of having good common schools without a college or university in the land. Remove the Regular Army and the National Guard as it is to-day would not survive half a generation. This would be true even if the Guard had never seen an army officer in the line of official contact. The Army is the conservator of the military art and tradition. It gathers and treasures the experience of the past wars from which it formulates organization, regulations, drill systems, means of supply, administration and plans of battles and campaigns. It keeps abreast of the times in arms, equipments and all mechanism of war. And it also manufactures, as it were, a standard of discipline and military ethics. Without the example of all this the citizen soldiery would be at sea in attempts at organization and control. This suggests the proper employment of the Regular Army during time of peace. It is not enough that the Army be a perfect piece of physical machinery; it should also be the embodied martial soul of the nation, ready at the call of duty to animate with its spirit and knowledge the real Army on which we must rely to uphold the honor and dignity of the United States.

But in a higher sense there is mutual dependence and community of interest between the Regular Army and the National Guard. The latter is dependent on the former for moral support and inspiration as well as for theoretical and practical instruction, and the former relies upon the Guard as a valuable adjunct in its work of keeping the country in as complete a state of preparation for war as means at hand will permit. The National Guard is

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also a factor in the education of the Army, for it is mainly with the citizen soldiery that the wars of this country will have to be carried on, and any duty or association which brings army officers in active contact with the material with which they will have to work, when the time for work comes, is a valuable experience for them and a benefit to the country. Another, and a kindred field of useful employment for the Army in time of peace, is found in the military training of the youth of the country at the institutions of learning. While this means of training the people for military duty is necessarily secondary in its value to that derived through the National Guard, it cannot fail of being of great benefit. Previous to the War of the Rebellion the Army seems to have taken little or no part in the instruction and encouragement of the militia, nor did it otherwise engage in the dissemination of military knowledge among the people; consequently when the war broke out ignorance of military matters was dense. Perhaps it was realization of this ignorance which prompted Congress in 1862 to provide for the detail of twenty army officers as instructors of the military art at certain colleges. Since then the number has, from time to time, been increased to one hundred. It was not until about twenty years subsequent to the close of the war that army officers came much in contact with the National Guard as inspectors, instructors, etc., and about this time the National Guard commenced its gradual increase in numbers and efficiency. Before the war the Seventh New York, and a few other organizations, not more than could be counted on the fingers of one hand, were all that were worthy of notice. Now such States as New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and others, could turn out regiments and battalions able to sweep from the field ten times their own numbers of green men and boys, such as hurriedly came together at the rendezvous in 1861. Of the present condition of the National Guard and the relations of the Army to it, and also of military instruction in schools and colleges, the Secretary of War, in his report for this year, says:

"STATE TROOPS.

"The efforts of recent years to bring the Army into closer relations with the National Guard of the States may now be regarded as having established a permanent union between the two forces, advantageous to both. During the year 33 officers, 6 more than in the previous year, were permanently detailed at State head-

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quarters, and 43 States secured for temporary duty the services of army officers. State encampments of troops were held by 22 States, to which 25 additional officers were assigned as instructors and inspectors.

"The conditions are favorable to the development of a volunteer force of upwards of 100,000 men, of the highest efficiency and prepared for any service. Legislation, however, is necessary to put to the best use the relations which have been established between the Army and the troops of the States. The laws of the United States relating to the militia were enacted in 1792, and need thorough revision and renovation to bring them into accord with present requirements.

* * * * * *

"The appropriation for the National Guard has remained unchanged for many years, although the country's population has multiplied many fold. Repeated recommendations for an increase of this appropriation have not met with favorable response from Congress, though the reasons for such increase seem obvious. * * *

"Community of interests, mutual respect, and familiarity with each other's methods have been established between the Army and the State troops in peace, but unity of action on the field requires uniform armament and equipment.

* * * * * *

"MILITARY SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES.

"The number of pupils at schools and colleges receiving military instruction from officers of the Army has more than doubled within the last four years, and the steadily increasing interest of the youth of the land in military affairs is apparent. Last year 99 officers, a larger number than in any former year were detached for this duty. The students attending schools and colleges at which military instruction was regularly imparted during the year numbered 35,638, of whom 23,723 were capable of military duty.

"The relations of these schools with the National Guard of the States are becoming closer, and one of the valuable consequences of this system of military instruction is that those receiving it in many instances after leaving school enter the National Guard as officers, and thus contribute to the morale and discipline of our citizen soldiers.

"I renew my recommendation that the law be so amended as

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to extend the opportunities for military instruction by officers of the Army to high schools of cities and normal schools of States having a requisite number of pupils."

* * * * * *

From this it is seen that "the employment of the Army during time of peace" is, to an extent never before attained, the instructing of the militia and the youth of the country in the duties of soldiers that we may not be entirely defenseless in the face of so terrible a danger as modern war.

In closing these suggestions of what we deem to be proper future employment of the Army in peace time, it will be noticed that no new or strange line of duties is recommended. It is believed that the Army is, in all essential things, now employed to as good advantage as is possible with the means at hand. It is the duty of the Army through its higher officers first, to represent to the people what, from a professional standpoint, is deemed necessary for the public defense, and if the people, through Congress, do not see fit to provide all that is represented as necessary, then it becomes all the more its duty to make the very best use of that which is provided. And that is the course now being pursued by the military establishment. The Army realizes that with its own numbers it could not hope to fight the country's battles, and it also realizes that under modern conditions of war, citizens without advantage of military training would, in the beginning, be no help, because the enemy would allow no time for their organization and instruction. It therefore struggles with the means at hand to maintain itself at a high standard of proficiency, and at the same time to assist in building up an organized and instructed citizen soldiery that could be relied upon to help stay the first blows of war, until armies could be organized out of the raw material, and sufficiently instructed to be put in line of battle. So far as the details go the manner of carrying out these duties is not a matter for present discussion, but some features of the work may be mentioned. Fads and reforms sometimes run away with original designs. Too much should not be attempted. It is better to have say a hundred thousand good militia, than two or three hundred thousand that are not good. It is better to give a considerable degree of military instruction to, say twenty thousand school boys, than to give a very little to half a million. It would be unfortunate to bring military instruction into contempt by spreading it too thin.

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But to return to the peace duties of the Army. It only remains to be said that the concentration of the Army at fewer and larger posts as now going on, will put it in better condition to carry on its life work than it has heretofore obtained. Drills, field exercises and theoretical instruction through the lyceums and the service schools at Forts Monroe, Leavenworth and Riley, can be better carried on; and the Army should stand high as a military body. Of recent years a Bureau of Military Information has been organized in the War Department, and through its labors a knowledge of the world's progress in the art of war can be stored for use when the time of its need comes. The Indian troubles are about over, and many details of military requirements can be carried out.

THE NECESSITY FOR AN INCREASE OF THE ARMY.

For nearly twenty years, last past, every successive Secretary of War and most military committees of the two houses of Congress have favored an increase of the Army. Mr. Samuel J. Tilden's dying admonition to his countrymen was to urge the imperative necessity for a proper system of sea-coast defense. Such eminent soldiers as Sherman and Sheridan and a host of others, have time and again called attention to the dangers that threaten this country from a neglect of the Army, and asked for such reasonable addition of soldiers as in their judgment would at least partially remedy the evil. Now the significance of all this is simply that when any intelligent man of affairs, either statesman or soldier, is led by his duties to fully investigate the subject, the dangers of continued neglect of the military necessities of the country become apparent.

Speaking of the Army as an organization without reference to its external duties, it has been said that it should bend its talents and energy to bringing itself to the highest attainable standard of perfection; and this becomes all the more necessary by reason of its being a small army, which may at any time have large problems to solve. To attain that high standard it is necessary that the Army should be of sufficient strength to render it practicable to apply drill regulations and tactical problems and evolutions to a degree sufficient for intelligent demonstration of their uses in campaign and on the field of battle. As applied to this phase of the question nothing more forceful can be said than is found in the following quotation from the pen of Colonel Maurice, of the British army (Encyclopædia Britannica, vol. 24,

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p. 356), a military writer and student of the art of war of acknowledged ability.

"In any case, going back once more to the experience of the past, we are now at a time in these matters very like that which preceded the Peninsular War. The drill which was employed in the Peninsula was in all essentials worked out by Sir John Moore in a series of experiments conducted at the camp of Shorncliffe. No more important results were ever obtained by peace-training for war than those which were deduced from these experimental exercises. If we really reverence the great soldiers of the Peninsula, this is the way in which we shall honor them. We shall not do what they did not. We shall not accept the traditions of the past forms which are not adapted to actual warfare. We shall not write drill books in the study or bureau, and force field movements into conformity with them. We shall employ for the work of our great camps of exercise generals who have made an exhaustive study of the present conditions of warfare, and staff officers who can assist them in their work. We shall experimentally try 'those suggestions which have upon them any reasonably good stamp of approval by military men of skill.' We shall really and crucially investigate them, 'with opportunity afforded to proposers to meet difficulties that may be suggested.' 'Those proposals which can be defended from serious theoretical objections should be submitted to a few months' experiment in selecting regiments, and reported on as to their practical working in the essential points of simplicity and uniformity of manœuvre, adaptability to circumstances arising, maintenance of order, retention of unity of commands, rapid recovery of exact tactical form, and fire control. Then let authority take what is best, it may be adopting here one detail and there another.'"

This suggests an urgent need for a moderate increase of the strength of the enlisted force of the Army, as well as for the reorganization of the infantry arm, for with the present strength and organization it is impossible for the Army to engage in such practical instruction as is outlined by Colonel Maurice, and without which an army cannot reach the highest state of preparation for war. While we may never have an army of sufficient size to admit of such extensive field manœuvres as are annually carried on by the German and French armies, we could with a very moderate increase of strength carry out invaluable instruction on a moderate scale. In fact the present strength does not admit of a proper

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application of the ordinary drill exercises of companies and battalions.

But the necessities for an increase of the Army growing out of the actual demands of the duty which the Army may be called upon to perform would be the more readily understood and appreciated by the country at large. The first demand of that nature to be taken up for consideration is secondary in urgency to other demands, but should appeal strongly to the minds of all thinking citizens. It is found in the continued employment of the Army in relation to internal disorders in cases when the laws are "obstructed by combinations too powerful to be overcome by the ordinary judicial proceedings." Until human wisdom, growing out of experience, shall have arrived at a proper adjustment of the relations between collective capital and collective labor, as both have but recently come to be employed, strikes are inevitable, and without stopping to inquire into their merits—when the blame attaches to oppressive corporations, or when to unreasonable labor organizations—the fact remains that out of strikes will come riots, involving in their unlawful violence many otherwise good, but thoughtless men. Of socialists and anarchists, as a distinctive menace from their unaided acts, perhaps little need be feared in this country, but the following words of Judge Cooley suggest grave cause of apprehension from their presence with us. The Judge says (*Forum*, September, 1894):

"Now, we have anarchists in our country; they submit to no government if they can escape it, even if to that end they must make use of the dagger, the bomb, or the torch; and they openly applaud this murder. They have gathering-places where by frantic appeals to passion and prejudice they seek to make converts to their doctrines; and when anything occurs to excite other classes to a temporary disregard of law, they are ever ready and willing to swell the ranks of discontent, and to give destructive effect, so far at least as they may with safety do so, to their hatred of government, not hesitating in some cases to take great personal risks.

"We justly look upon these men as foes to the human race, for their doctrines, if given full effect, would plunge us into a condition of worse savagery than history shows to have heretofore existed."

As here suggested the danger is that some day these anar-

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chists will throw a fire-brand into an ordinary mob, in the way outlined by Judge Cooley, that will be snatched up by a Lord George Gordon and a Barnaby Rudge, and a whole city will go to ashes. It is not enough that we be able to subdue and punish those who should engage in any such unlawful acts, but every dictate of sound governmental policy, patriotism and humanity, demands that we labor to reduce to the minimum the chances of so dire a calamity. This can be done, in a reasonable measure at least, by being prepared to meet unlawful violence by lawful force—physical force. Does not this suggest a necessity for a reasonable increase of the Army? Heretofore the Army has without much difficulty suppressed such mobs as it has come in contact with in the line of duty. But it has accomplished this by moral force—not physical force. Mobs and law-breakers have yielded submission to it because it has represented to them the power and majesty of the United States. It has been to them an awe-inspiring symbol of national authority. How will it be when the spell is broken? And sooner or later it will be broken. Suppose the overwhelming numbers of the Chicago mob had turned on the small military force sent against them? Of course there is no doubt of what the final outcome would have been. The mob would have gone down, and in the end law and order would have triumphed,—at what cost of blood and treasure it is sickening to contemplate. We want no such scars on the history of this free country.

Thus far nothing has been said concerning the National Guard of the various States as a conservator of the peace. The National Guard has on a great number of occasions performed invaluable service in quelling disorders and upholding law. It can and doubtless will do so in the future. But its greatest usefulness and efficiency in such duty is naturally with troubles more or less local in their nature and existence, and coming under state jurisdiction. For instance, the unfortunate troubles of last year were so widespread, of so peculiar a character, and withal so alarming as to the number of men who allowed themselves to become committed to unlawful acts either by actual participation in such acts, or by a manifest willingness to join in them in certain contingencies, that it could not be claimed that it would have been the part of wisdom to rely upon the National Guard to uphold the law under such circumstances, and in the face of the dangers of so grave a nature and extent. It was a most fortunate thing

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that the President found a way to send National troops direct to the various scenes of trouble without allowing them to be tripped up by State lines. And it was another fortunate thing that the discovery was made that it would hardly be possible for mob violence of any magnitude to take place without violating the laws of the United States. But, aside from all this, it is not the part of good policy to use the National Guard in such duty more than can be helped. National Guardsmen, when not in uniform in actual performance of a military duty are civilians. While law-breakers and rioters as a class, are not entitled to a great deal of consideration, yet the nature and character of many disorders are such as to enlist on the part of the law-breakers a considerable share of the sympathies of the surrounding community. Now, without going into much of a discussion of this phase of the question, it is well to remark as we go along that it would be better policy not to subject the National Guard to such embarrassing duties as that of shooting at their neighbors.

In regard to such Indian outbreaks as may hereafter occur—and many are liable to occur—the present strength of the Army is ample to successfully meet them.

We now come to consider the question of a necessity for an increase of the Army for war purposes. The necessity for an increase of the Army on account of police duty has been classed as secondary to the necessities for its increase as a preparation for war. The two duties are not really comparable; they are of a different nature, each having its own peculiar demand. Whilst the Army may be too small to properly guard the internal interests of the country from dangers of unlawful disturbance, the damage resulting from its inadequacy could be remedied by calling to its aid other help, for it would be numbers, not organization and discipline that the Army would have to overcome, and such help as it could get would be as efficient, man for man, as would be the lawbreakers it would have to subdue. But not so in war. All Europe is a military camp. All the great powers, and some of those that are not great, are organized, armed, equipped, drilled and ready to march to the field of battle at the word of command. Should war occur we would have no time for preparation. We would have to meet its first blows with such organized force as we happened to have. And for that reason the ready strength of the Army carries more importance in relation to war than it does to police duties.

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It has been said that our policy of non-intervention in the politics of the world is one-sided, in that it binds no one not to interfere with us. But if we aspire to become a great factor in the world's commerce, as the building of warships and our desire to revive a merchant marine indicate, can we rely upon keeping out of international complications? Can we rely upon keeping out of them in any event? We already have one hand on the Sandwich Islands, an eye on the Nicaragua Canal route and another on the affairs of South America, and many of our citizens are winking both eyes at the insurgents in Cuba while fifty thousand European soldiers are there trying to suppress the insurrection. (Within the last quarter of a century Spain has sacrificed over two hundred thousand soldiers to the battle-fields and climate of Cuba—but little over three cannon shot lengths of our shores.) The Fur Seal of Behring Sea, retiring and inoffensive as he appears, came near involving us in most serious trouble—even the possibility of war—but a short time ago. It is even reported that we now have some misunderstanding with England growing out of the boundary question of Alaska, and the expected reply of Lord Salisbury to Mr. Olney's note in relation to the Venezuelan dispute may not satisfy the Monroe doctrine. Russia, powerful and ambitious—to all appearance the coming great power of the world—has worked its way across the continent of Asia, and has become our neighbor. Japan, but recently waked from its slumber of effete civilization, has buried its own corpse and stepped forth a young and vigorous nation. It has had its first taste of blood, and like all animals, whether biped or quadruped, has but had its appetite whetted for more. All Europe is armed and ready for war at any time. A few days ago the German emperor was quoted as saying to an American naval officer: "You are building those ships to fight England." The British lion has his claws all over the American continent. He has an ally of five million stalwart Anglo-Saxons stretched from one end to the other of our Northern frontier, with the great St. Lawrence to float his largest ships of war well to our rear, and canals by which his gunboats can reach Chicago and Duluth. He has a line of strongholds and fortifications all the way from Quebec, Halifax and Bermuda, passing down our Atlantic seaboard scarcely out of sight of our land, and on around South America. He has also a naval station and fortifications at our back door on Puget Sound. These fortified strongholds are kept manned and

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supplied—for what? But let us hope that the German emperor was wrong in his prediction. All this may not suggest the probability of our becoming involved in war in the near future, but it does most certainly suggest the possibility of our becoming so involved at any time. Thirty-one years is the longest peace period we have ever enjoyed. It is now over thirty years since we last sheathed the sword.

We boast of being a peaceful nation—are we? Let us look to the record. From 1775 to 1875 we devoted one-sixth of our time to war. Think of it, an average of five days out of every month for a hundred years! From the beginning of this century to the present time, we have spent over one-tenth of our time at the trade of war, and during the last eighty-five years have, with possibly one exception, carried on more warfare than any of the great nations of Europe, or of the world for that matter. And all this in addition to our Indian troubles, which are an offset for desultory fighting of Europeans on the continent of Africa and in the remote corners of Asia. In the four years of the War of the Rebellion this country, North and South, sacrificed more men on the field of battle than have the British Isles in all their wars since the days of William the Conqueror. In one century of our existence we have made more use of the military arm of the Government in suppressing internal disorders than has England in all the time since the Monmouth Rebellion. About thirty years ago we sent an army to the Rio Grande preparatory to kicking a scion of the House of Hapsburg and a European army off this continent. And we would have done it had not the threat answered for the deed. From first to last we have enrolled about five millions of our citizens for war purposes (including the Confederate armies). It seems that we keep the peace very much after the manner of Mark Twain's friend, Mr. Buck Fanshaw, late of Virginia City, Nevada. Mr. Fanshaw was preëminently a man of peace. He couldn't tolerate rows, and when he saw one going on he quietly and unostentatiously took his six shooter and proceeded to convert the rioters into corpses. But tradition has it that finally, in the confidence of self-conceit, Mr. Fanshaw fell to neglecting his six shooters. He is dead. And yet with this record before us we can truthfully and safely boast that at no time and under no circumstances, not even in the midst of the excitement, gloom and doubt precipitated by the assassination of Lincoln in the presence of a million victorious soldiers under idol-

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ized leaders, have our free institutions been in danger from the hands of the Army.

It has not been the intention, in preparing this paper, to go extensively into details. Statistical information concerning wealth, commerce, population, and kindred subjects, as well as the politics and policies of the nations of the world, are matters of daily discussion in the public prints, and introduced here would only tend to burden the mind with useless repetition of that which the reader already knows. Do the conditions surrounding the United States indicate a possibility of our becoming involved in war with a foreign power? And if so should the Regular Army be increased before war is upon us in order that we may be better able to meet it? And if answered in the affirmative, how much should we increase the Army becomes another question. Assuming that the conditions do indicate that we may be forced into war, and that it is necessary to increase the Army to meet such a contingency, the last question will be discussed. First let us see what the strength of the Regular Army has been in the past and how it stands to-day in relation to other armies. For convenience in discussing these matters the following tables may be of convenient reference.

TABLE I.—UNITED STATES, 1790–1895.

Year.	Strength of Army.	Population.	Number of population to each soldier.	Number of soldiers per million of population.
	In peace			
1790	672	3,929,000	5,847	224
1800	4,051	5,308,000	1,310	810
10	6,886	7,500,000	1,089	983
20	8,686	9,634,000	1,109	965
30	5,951	12,866,000	2,162	496
40	10,570	17,069,000	1,615	622
50	10,763	23,192,000	2,155	468
60	16,367	31,443,000	1,921	528
67	56,815	*35,000,000	616	1,623
70	37,075	38,558,000	1,040	976
80	27,605	50,156,000	1,817	552
90	28,110	62,622,000	2,228	453
95	27,897	*70,000,000	2,509	398
	In war			
1814	38,186	*8,000,000	210	4,773
47	21,686	*20,000,000	922	1,084
65	22,310	*33,000,000	1,479	676

* Estimated.

1895— { Area of United States : 2,970,000 square miles.
Population per square mile : 23.57.
One soldier to each 106 square miles.

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TABLE II.—PRINCIPAL NATIONS, 1895.

Country.	Army.		Population.	Area Square Miles.
	Peace Footing.	War Footing.		
United States	28,000	143,000	70,000,000	2,970,000
Austria-Hungary	354,000	1,900,000	41,350,000	240,000
Canada, Dominion of	*38,000	.....	4,860,000	.....
France	564,000	3,200,000	38,340,000	204,000
Germany	579,000	2,500,000	49,400,000	208,000
Great Britain and Ireland	154,000	660,000	38,770,000	121,000
Italy	282,000	1,400,000	30,720,000	110,000
Japan	77,000	260,000	41,385,000	147,000
Mexico	37.000	160,000	12,080,000	750,000
Russia	843,000	2,500,000	119,000.000	8,600,000
Spain	80,000	170,000	17,670,000	194,000

* Militia.

TABLE III.—PRINCIPAL NATIONS, 1895.

Country.	No. Population to each Soldier.		No. Soldiers per million of Population.		Population per Square Mile.	No. Square Miles to each Soldier.	
	Peace.	War.	Peace.	War.		Peace.	War.
United States	2,464	493	406	2,029	23.23	106.07	21 21
Austria-Hungary	117	22	8,634	46,341	172.29	.68	.13
Canada, Dominion of	128	...	9,500	.....	.....	.....	....
France	68	12	14,842	84,211	187.94	.36	.06
Germany	85	20	11,816	51,020	237.50	.36	.08
Great Britain and Ireland	252	59	4,053	17.368	320.41	.79	.18
Italy	109	22	9,400	46,677	279.27	.39	.08
Japan	537	159	1,878	6,341	281.53	1 91	.57
Mexico	326	75	3,083	13,333	16.11	20 27	4 69
Russia	141	48	7,084	21,008	13.84	10.20	3.44
Spain	221	104	4,706	10,000	91.08	2 43	1.14

These tables show the strength of our military establishment, as compared to that of any of the great European powers, to be so insignificant as to really destroy the force of comparison; one might as well try to measure a gas jet by the sun. They also disclose the less generally known fact that at the present time, with our per capita wealth many times greater than it was in the ante-bellum days, our army is much smaller as compared to the population than it has been since 1790. At the same time European armies are to-day better organized, better equipped for war, and larger than they have been at any time in the history of Europe. But striking as these figures are, they fail to impress their full significance on our minds, for it is difficult for us to realize that the lack

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TABLE IV.—WARS OF THE UNITED STATES.

Statement of the Number of United States Troops Engaged.

Wars.	From—	To—	Regulars.	Militia and Vol'nt's.	Total.
Northwestern Indian Wars	Sept. 19, 1790	Aug. 3, 1795	.....	.....	8,983
War with France	July 9, 1798	Sept. 30, 1800	.....	.....	*4,593
War with Tripoli	June 10, 1801	June 4, 1805	...	.....	*3,330
Creek Indian War	July 27, 1813	Aug. 9, 1814	600	13,181	13,781
War of 1812 with Great Britain	June 18, 1812	Feb. 17, 1815	85,000	471,622	556,622
Seminole Indian War	Nov. 20, 1817	Oct. 21, 1818	1,000	6,911	7,911
Black Hawk Indian War	Apl. 21, 1831	Sept. 31, 1832	1,339	5,126	6,465
Cherokee Disturbance or removal	1836	1837	.....	9,494	9,494
Creek Indian War or Disturbance	May 5, 1836	Sept. 30, 1837	935	12,483	13,418
Florida Indian War	Dec. 23, 1835	Aug. 14, 1843	11,169	29,953	41,122
Aroostook Disturbance	1836	1839	.....	1,500	1,500
War with Mexico	Apl. 24, 1846	July 4, 1848	30,954	73,776	104,730
Apache, Navajo & Utah War	1849	1855	1,500	1,061	2,561
Seminole Indian War	1856	1858	.....	3,687	3,687
Civil War	April, 1861	August, 1865			2,772,408
Total					3,550,605

* Naval forces engaged.

of preparation for war, should war come, is vastly more potent of disaster to-day than it was, say in 1861, going back to our own last experience. But even that experience teaches little, for in the start the opposing armies were equally raw. It is only the old veteran of the war who can realize what would have been the fate of the army of Bull Run in the face of a fourth of its number drawn from the armies of Grant or Lee in 1864. And yet the Bull Run army had over two months' time for organization and training; while now it would not be allowed as many days for preparation were it in Europe, and, as it is, it would only have such time as the enemy would require in crossing the ocean. Several causes have worked the change; among them the invention and improvement of arms and ammunition, and all mechanism of war, which increases many-fold the destructive power of a given number of men; the increased facilities of transportation, which enable armies to be placed almost instantly in the proposed theatre of operations; and what is of still more weight is that the military powers hold in barracks immense armies under the most complete organization and fully equipped in these respects. Every demand for war, not only of soldiers and equipment, but of

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worked-out plans of operations, are at all times ready for immediate application. To be prepared for war in the European sense of to-day means—literally not figuratively—that war declared Monday would be followed by a million trained soldiers in march for the battle-fields Tuesday.

We are helplessly unprepared to meet these conditions; but happily we need not be prepared, for the oceans intervene to prevent the possibility of our ever being overwhelmed by one of these immense engines of modern war. What we may have to meet, however, and for that we are also discouragingly unprepared, is such a part of one or more of these armies as could be transported to our shores in ships. It is estimated that England holds at home about seventy-five thousand troops in readiness for foreign war; her navy is beyond comparison the most powerful in the world, and in war with us would have the advantage of fortified strongholds and coaling stations at Quebec, Halifax, Bermuda, in the West Indies, and at Esquimault at the entrance to Puget Sound. Canada would be an ally of England. That is not all: history teaches us that England usually carries on her wars with brains, money and other people. If we should become embroiled in war with her it is almost certain we should find her with some ally, great or small, who could furnish any number of soldiers that ships could carry to America. With the other powers, means of transport and naval force would be the controlling consideration, for there is practically no limit to the strength of their armies. In other words the carrying capacity of available ships would put the limitation upon a force to be sent against us by one or more of the European powers. What this limitation would be is more or less a matter of conjecture. It is conceded however by military men who have given the matter thought and investigation, that an army of at least seventy-five or one hundred thousand, with the supplies and ordnance necessary to carry on modern war, could at once be landed on our shores. Of course the fleet of transports would be under strong naval convoy, and until our own navy is considerably increased and sea-coast defenses are built, there would be but little difficulty on the part of the enemy in effecting a landing; at what point it is not possible to predict.

Now, no matter how we look at the problem, even if we view it through the ultra pessimistic atmosphere with which some army officers are wont to envelop our military policy, the most we have reasonable cause to apprehend from foreign land forces

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is a sudden blow by an army of about one hundred thousand—and such augmentation of that force as could be sent against us before we could pull ourselves together ready to fight. It is conceded that combinations could be made by which we would be menaced by a great force, but such a contingency is remote. If, then, we be prepared to meet the first blows of a hostile army of about one hundred thousand, we may rest in reasonable security so far as our military necessities depend upon land forces to meet land forces. (The construction and manning of sea-coast defenses is another phase of the problem.) But it is obvious that we are not now prepared to meet, even on our own soil, a well-appointed modern army of seventy-five thousand. Our army is put down as twenty-eight thousand, inclusive of officers and men. But from this would have to be deducted a considerable number as non-combatants, and many points, such as arsenals, depots, sea-coast defenses, etc., would demand large deductions, so that fifteen thousand is about the strength with which the army could confront the enemy. The paper strength of the organized militia (National Guard) of the several States shows one hundred and fifteen thousand officers and men. After making due allowance for inefficient or inaccessible organizations, and for individual guardsmen who from various causes would not respond, it would be a good showing if the President's call brought to the colors fifty per cent. of the total force, or say sixty thousand National Guardsmen. This would give a total army of about seventy-five thousand officers and men. Many of the National Guard would be efficient for good service; some would be lacking in drill, with discipline but fair; and a large proportion would be of little service until they could be brought into shape after being called out. In the confusion of improvised organization, this mixed force would be but fairly effective until seasoned by a little service. The enemy would be picked troops from the most highly trained armies that the world has ever seen. As the Englishman would say: "There is no use blinking the question," we need to be better prepared to meet even such an emergency. So far as concerns the demands of a war to be carried beyond sea or with Europeans in Central or South America, little need be said. At present our navy and shipping are not such as to afford a safe convoy of a large army across the waters, and should the necessity of such a war threaten, we would have to possess ourselves with patience. Perhaps troops for such a purpose could be prepared

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for service as rapidly as could the means of placing them in the proposed theatre of action. The real army with which we will carry on our wars will be drawn from the ten million of arms-bearing people of this country when war is upon us. With this army we would finally triumph. The mission of the Regular Army and the organized militia is to hold the first line as above outlined, until the levies could be organized and receive some degree of instruction; and lack of preparation to thus "hold the fort" would cost us dearly.

With those who have given the subject intelligent study in the light of modern military conditions it is an unquestioned fact that our peace establishment is too small to meet these demands, and that should the crisis ever come disaster and humiliation beyond the measure of money would be the penalty of neglect. Prussia defeated Austria in a six weeks' campaign—Prussia was prepared for war, Austria was not. At the end of a seven months' war France was abject at the feet of Germany, despoiled of her provinces and compelled to pay to her conqueror the cost of her own humiliation—Germany was prepared for war, France was not. Yet France and Austria were infinitely better prepared then than we are now, and under equal conditions their troops, man for man, would be as good as those of Germany. The hordes of China were as chaff before the wind in the face of Japan's organized and disciplined army. Time between declaration of war and commencement of hostilities has been annihilated—long wars are things of the past—unorganized enthusiasm had a relative force in the old days of short-range muzzle-loaders, but in the face of modern military mechanism it is powerless. Americans make the best soldiers in the world, we have ten millions of arms-bearing people from which to draw armies, and we could whip any nation on earth—if that nation would give us time to get ready—but "there's the rub."

Now there is another side of our military weakness which calls for more men: the sea-coast defenses. General Abbot, one of the ablest and most accomplished officers of the Corps of Engineers, says (JOURNAL MILITARY SERVICE INSTITUTION, May, 1894):

"What, then, are our real needs in the way of coast defense? The United States has an immense seaboard, exceeding 3000 miles in length on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, and half as much more on the Pacific, not including Alaska. * * *

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"The United States has also extensive water frontiers on the great Lakes and at Alaska. * * *

"Upon the whole extent of the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific coasts there are about thirty ports which demand local protection for their cities, now exposed to occupation or destruction, and of these about a dozen are so important as centres of commercial wealth that the entire country has much at stake in their security. Nine out of this number are also important as containing naval stations and depots of supply, without which our new ships of war would be unable to keep the sea or perform any service in war; for it must not be forgotten that naval bases are as indispensable in these days of steam as are bases of supplies for armies in the field. In fact, this statement hardly puts the matter strongly enough, for our new ships would be exposed to capture and used against us, if they should attempt to operate on their natural element, the ocean, without ports of refuge in which to find security when overmatched.

"Besides these thirty ports now urgently demanding protection there are about seventy others whose local importance would justify inexpensive earthworks; which, armed with the best of our old type of ordnance, and having in view the small inducements offered to an enemy to attack, would afford the needed protection. * * *

"This Board recommended the expenditure of $93,448,800 for land defenses and their armament." * * *

This work is progressing as rapidly as congressional appropriations permit. It is estimated that when completed, these defenses would require seventy to eighty thousand men to man them in time of war. In that event volunteers and militia would have to be relied on to the larger extent, but in time of peace their care, and the necessity for the training of a large number of artillery officers and men for them, will require a considerable increase of the present strength of the artillery arm of the service. In fact, all conditions considered, it seems obvious that our greatest danger is to be apprehended from naval attack, and therefore increase of the artillery becomes of the first importance.

HOW MUCH SHOULD THE ARMY BE INCREASED?

In his annual report for 1893 Secretary of War Lamont said:

"The effort to maintain a maximum numerical military strength in which foreign powers are engaged is only of remote interest to us. Any considerable increase in the numbers of our

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army would not meet with popular favor, and is not suggested by any contingency, immediate or remote. What is desired is a maximum efficiency of the organization, sufficient elasticity to respond readily to any probable tension, the acquisition of the mechanism of warfare in adequate quantity and of the best quality, and such dissemination of military instruction as will enable the Federal Government, in the event of war, to summon for the purposes of immediate defense a body of its citizens, not unfamiliar with the rudiments of military discipline and service, sufficient until the great armies which exist in embryo in our free citizenship can be enrolled, organized, and put in the field."

Many officers in the Army whose opinions are entitled to great respect, not only on account of their rank but also because of their high standing and professional knowledge, and also many distinguished gentlemen in civil life, advocate a very considerable increase of the strength of the Regular Army. But, all the demands and conditions considered, our safety from being overrun as it were by the great armies of Europe, but not forgetting a due measure of danger from such a source, and keeping in mind our traditional dislike of standing armies, and at the same time looking at the question in a business light, regarding money spent on the Army as so much paid for the insurance of the peace, honor and dignity of the country as well as of property, it seems that a very moderate increase of the force would meet the interests of the people. In that view, and taking Secretary Lamont's report, above quoted, as a text, we will first consider the conditions which seem to demand an increase as outlined in this paper. First: The internal needs of the Army—that which is needed to make it a perfect machine for the work it may have to do. This demand is not great. Second: The duties that may and will be required of the Army under the orders of the President, in suppressing internal disturbances. This demand is difficult of determination. We really have no data by which to judge, for, as heretofore said, the Army thus far has suppressed mobs by moral force. What the Chicago mob of last year could and would have done had it really resorted to forcible resistance in its full strength of frenzy, is not known. It seems certain though, that in consideration of the other troubles then existing, the Army would have been wholly inadequate. Third: The demands of war. This is also in a certain degree an indeterminate quantity, and may go hand-in-hand with the needs of police duty. Fourth: The

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sea-coast defenses. Increase for this purpose is especially urgent, and as the defenses progress it will become a necessity.

Now, in consideration of all these demands, allowing a due limitation on account of the expected continual improvement of the strength and efficiency of the National Guard, if we adopt a policy of maintaining a Regular Army with its minimum strength at a fixed ratio of five hundred soldiers to one million of population, and with such expansive organization as would allow the enlisted force to be quickly increased fifty per cent., it would probably be a reasonable compromise between an ideal army and the present insufficient force. In round numbers this would give us now an army of thirty-five thousand officers and men, and hereafter periodical increase to that ratio should be made say every five years.* In making the first increase under such a system, only such officers as are necessary to a proper organization of the line of the Army should be added. What is just now needed is an increase of the force of enlisted men. But thereafter, in the periodical increases, organizations should be added to the fighting force of the Army. The staff is now larger than really needed if it be considered wholly in relation to the Army itself, but considering the mission of the Army in war it is doubtful if it would be wise to cut it down to the bare necessities of the internal needs of the peace strength of the Army. Reference has been made to the necessity for the Army to maintain itself at the highest possible standard of efficiency, and be ready at all times to properly render its full duty in case of war, not forgetting that this duty would at once become one of grave responsibility and vital importance to the country. Now, to enable the Army to fulfill these duties, the conditions of promotion should be such as to admit of officers arriving at positions of rank and responsibility before they pass the prime of military life, keeping in mind that most successful soldiers have been young men. It is not enough that under any system—even our present one, which finds officers after twenty-eight years' service still lieutenants—there will be young men in the Army. What would be needed for war would be young men of experience in command and other responsibili-

* Since this proposition for a fixed ratio of soldiers to population was written, newspaper accounts indicate that the Major General Commanding the Army has recommended the same policy. The full report has not been seen by the writer, and it is not known what strength for the Army it recommends, and therefore comment on it has not been thought advisable.

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ties. A system of periodical increase would be a material help in this way, and would thus not only increase the numbers in the Army, but would also increase its relative efficiency.

If the Army needs increasing at all, certainly a fixed ratio of five hundred soldiers per million of inhabitants is so moderate as to need no defense on the score of cost. For the sixty years ending with 1860 the country supported the Army at an average peace strength of about seven hundred soldiers per million of inhabitants (not counting the war periods of 1812-15 and 1846-48, during which there were much larger forces). At that ratio we would now have an army of about forty-nine thousand, and even if we had a greater force than that, we could much better afford it than could our fathers afford the army they maintained. At best an army is an expensive necessity somewhat in the nature of fire insurance. If the merchant could be assured that fire would never invade his premises, he would be foolish to pay for insurance; and if the Government could be assured that it would never need soldiers, it would be waste of the people's money to keep an army. But neither can have such assurance, and parsimony may cost the one hundreds of thousands and the other billions of dollars, while prudent expenditure of thousands by the merchant or millions by the Government would have averted the loss.

But here the parallel ends. Insurance only insures remuneration for loss by fire, and exercises no influence in preventing its taking place. An efficient army not only insures safety from absolute disaster should war occur, but it is the most potent of all agencies in preventing war. In his first term of office President Grant announced what he called a peace policy towards the Indians—it was a dismal failure. If President Grant had applied to statecraft the wisdom General Grant applied to warfare, he would have realized that at that time nothing short of two hundred thousand soldiers distributed in actual sight of the Indians could have insured a peace policy. It is so with rioters, insurrectionists, or nations. If the whiskey rioters of 1794 had thought that the government officials could have called on Fort Pitt for two or three hundred soldiers instead of knowing that they could get no more than eleven, it is doubtful if the insurrection would have taken place. And if we would pronounce the Monroe doctrine with conclusive emphasis and yet without war, it must be known that if needs be we are at all times prepared to italicise it with bayonets.

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

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

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THE ARMY;

ITS EMPLOYMENT DURING TIME OF PEACE, AND THE NECESSITY FOR ITS INCREASE.

BY

FIRST LIEUTENANT L. W. V. KENNON,

Sixth U. S. Infantry.

This Essay Received

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THE ARMY; ITS EMPLOYMENT DURING TIME OF PEACE, AND THE NECESSITY FOR ITS INCREASE.

By First Lieut. L. W. V. Kennon, 6th U. S. Infantry.

"PEACE is a dream," said Von Moltke. It is a dream as yet far from realization. Human nature must change before war shall cease; monarchs must lose ambition and lust of power; the strong must respect the rights of the weak; oppression and misrule must pass away; the spirit, not the professions of Christianity must reign universal, before man shall cease to war upon his kind.

At present, selfishness is the ruling motive in the intercourse both of men and nations. It is still "true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature, that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything by it." The just and pretended causes of war are infinite, and arbitration is not always appealed to for the adjustment of conflicting claims. Strong nations, where they may, will prefer by force to make good their pretensions whether they be just or unjust. It is idle to assert that Christian nations will practice the doctrine of love in their mutual dealings; and the past century, which has seen the highest development of Christian civilization, has been marked by the bloodiest wars the world has ever known.

We ourselves have not been exempt from the general scourge. One-sixth of our first century of national existence was spent in war. Remote as we are from the old world, and free as we are from "entangling alliances," the state of European politics has once drawn us into unavoidable war. The abridgment of time and space by electricity and steam has brought us closer to the outer world, and our relations

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with European powers are daily becoming more intimate, with greater danger of entanglement, clashing of interests, and war.

Of the many issues which may involve us in war, there are two which at this time* overshadow all others. These are encroachments on our national domain, and the Monroe doctrine. If current report be correct, the gold fields of Alaska are coveted by the British, and in that region England is claiming more than she dare hope for, in order to compromise, if need be, on what she really wants. Her policy has ever been one of aggression and contempt for rights she could not be forced to respect. Her friendship for us is limited only by her self-interest, and her respect for our rights only by her fear of our power to do her injury.

With all our ties of blood and language, England is our most dangerous foe. However peaceful her policy towards us, however cordial her protestations of friendship, she has surrounded us with an encircling line of fortifications, said to be the strongest on earth. Her forts and soldiers are found at Halifax, the Bermudas, the Bahamas and other West Indian ports, and at Vancouver; while her fleets command our every port.

Such preparations are not made with solely peaceful objects in view. Without perhaps intending or desiring to make war upon us, she has prepared for such a contingency, and a realization of her own strength and of our weakness, emboldens her to ignore our wishes and disregard our rights. She feels secure to carry out her designs, if not directly upon us, at least upon others of the American "sisterhood of Republics," a sisterhood she has long been desirous of destroying. "Monarchy in Mexico and monarchy in Brazil," wrote Canning, "would cure the evils of universal democracy and prevent the drawing of demarcation, which I most dread, America vs. Europe. The United States naturally enough aim at this division and cherish the democracy which leads to it."†

This natural desire was voiced by Jefferson, who said:

* December, 1895.

† Stapleton, Canning and his Times.

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"Our first and fundamental maxim should be never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe and peculiarly her own. She should, therefore, have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe."

This policy was announced to the world by Monroe, who asserted that the intervention of European powers in the affairs of American nations, in certain stated cases, was dangerous to our peace and safety, and a manifestation of an unfriendly spirit towards the United States.

The Monroe doctrine has been a potent force from its announcement to the present day. Reiterated and reaffirmed by successive Presidents, it has also received the cordial approval of all our greatest statesmen. It was solemnly adopted, after due reflection, and with a full realization that it might lead to war. "We will oppose with all our means the forcible interposition of any other power, as auxiliary, stipendary or under any other form or pretext, and most especially the transfer (of any American country) to any power by conquest, cession or acquisition in any other way."*

This doctrine may be looked upon as purely national; it has no place in international law, except that under that code interference in the exercise of power by another nation is justified when demanded by self-preservation. Believing that the Monroe doctrine is for us a necessary policy, vital to our peace, prosperity and safety, it is not only our right, but our manifest duty to assert and uphold it against the world. Other nations will accept it only so far as we are able to enforce it against them; none strong enough to defy us will consider its precepts binding or govern itself by them.

Our maintenance of the doctrine interferes with the just right of none; incidentally, it assures the rights of the weaker governments of America, and protects them against European aggression.

It was not asserted against a vague and theoretical danger merely. It is reasonable to believe that the absorption

*Jefferson.

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of the Latin-American countries by European powers has been prevented by it alone. An example of its efficacy is shown in the attempt to establish the Empire of Mexico under Maximillian. At the present day, with the principles of the balance of power applied to Asia, and with Africa partitioned among the powers of Europe, South America alone remains for the further extension of their colonies. England is apparently enlarging her territorial possessions at the expense of Venezuela, while Europe in general, and France and Germany in particular, join her in protesting against our assertion of the Monroe doctrine, to discredit which, rumor says they have formed a secret alliance. They affirm that it is inimical to their interests; but they have no just right with which it interferes, and their interests can only be enhanced by opening the way to usurpation and conquest on this continent.

The opportunity seems favorable for asserting their disapproval of our policy. England has a navy, the most powerful in the world, while we have one of the weakest. It is believed she may work her will in Venezuela, where we are powerless to oppose her. Were it not for her isolation among nations, the enormous pecuniary interests of the people in this country, and a consciousness that the outcome of war with us must ultimately be disastrous to her, there can be little doubt that she would maintain the stand she has taken.* As it is, she disregards our protest and declines our request that she submit her claims to arbitration; tells us in

* England's tardy recognition of the justice of our case, in December, 1896, is probably due to the causes mentioned, and mainly to fear of pecuniary loss to herself rather than to respect for us. In a recent work on "Naval Policy," Mr. G. W. Steevens, of Pembroke College, Oxford, says: "At present the menace (of the United States) may be lightly regarded, for the ocean fleet is still in its infancy. * * * Fifty years hence will tell a very different tale. * * * From the military point of view, therefore, it seems a great pity that Lord Salisbury did not meet Mr. Cleveland's impertinence of December, 1895, in a far firmer spirit. Had war come, we could probably have taken or destroyed most of the United States warships, and laid under contribution or destroyed New York, Philadelphia, Boston, New Orleans and San Francisco. Conquer the United States we could not—that is an impossibility; but with a few heavy blows at the outset we might have sickened them of the war and the new fleet at the same time."

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diplomatic language that the matter is none of our business, and relinquishes not an inch of the territory she has seized.

When foreign powers believed in our military strength, a different tone was used. The nations, including England, which now denounce the Monroe doctrine as "presumptuous and preposterous pretensions," were careful, in 1861, in deference to it and to our power, to "bind themselves not to seek for themselves in the employment of the coercive measures foreseen by the present convention any acquisition of territory, or any peculiar advantage, and not to exercise in the subsequent affairs of Mexico any influence of a character to impair the right of the Mexican nation to choose and freely to constitute the form of its own government." * Another article provided that a copy of the convention "should be communicated to the Government of the United States."

Subsequently, the opinion of European statesmen was general that our Government would be unable to suppress the rebellion; our prestige was broken by domestic faction and civil war. The terms of the convention were forgotten, and a monarchic form of government was inaugurated in Mexico under French and Austrian auspices. The Rebellion crushed, France was informed that she must "desist from the prosecution of armed intervention in Mexico." Austria was notified that the sending of troops from that country to Mexico would be regarded as a cause of war by the United States. At the same time fifty thousand of our veterans were concentrated near the Mexican border. These measures proved effective; no more troops were sent from Austria, and the French withdrew from Mexico.

So it is. All human governments rest ultimately on force. Behind the diplomatist, giving weight and compelling attention to his views, is the military power of the nation he represents. To this power, or to the belief in it by others, he owes his influence. It is the basis on which rests the safety of our citizens abroad, the security of our commerce with foreign peoples, and the respect paid to us as a nation.

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* Wharton, International Law Digest, Vol. I, p. 313.

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At the close of the Rebellion we were the most powerful nation on earth. Our flag was respected and our counsels heeded in every land. England, France, Austria, Japan, China, Korea, all felt and yielded to our physical might a compliance to our wishes for which otherwise we had sued in vain. To a great extent this has passed away. The veterans of 1865 are now too old to bear arms, and their places have not been filled. Europe has watched, with mingled wonder and satisfaction, the decline of our military prestige, the abolition of our armies, the dispersion of our fleets. They have studied our system, and have noted our military decadence. To-day the puniest nations insult our flag and the uniform of our sailors. The stronger ones presume upon our weakness to disregard our rights and to subvert our policy. In foreign lands there exists a feeling at least akin to contempt for America, and some of our citizens abroad have been known to deny their country and appeal to the British flag for protection in their business enterprises.

Such conditions exert a considerable influence over our business relations in other lands, and if our foreign trade languishes, to these conditions, in part at least, must be ascribed the cause.

We are one of the family of nations, and must demand and enforce the respect due to the most favored. Our honor, dignity, prestige, commerce and safety, all require that every other nation should believe in our ability to maintain our rights by force. Our prosperity and wealth are more apt to excite envy and greed than friendship. We cannot permit ourselves to believe that our combined wealth and weakness will not tempt a stronger power to make war upon us. We cannot delude ourselves with the fond hope that nations will apply the doctrine of love to us and of avarice to all the rest. We must stand among them as an equal, commanding and enforcing respect by the only thing for which they have respect—their belief in our military strength.

"Unsafe and precarious would be our situation were we to neglect the means to maintaining our rights. * * * A steady perseverance in a system of national defense, commensurate with our resources and the situation of our coun-

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try, is an obvious dictate of wisdom. For remote as we are placed from the belligerent nations, and desirous as we are, by doing justice to all, to avoid offense to any, nothing short of the power of repelling aggression will secure to our country a rational prospect of escaping the calamities of war or national degradation."*

The teaching of reason and experience is that "neither the pacific disposition of the American people nor the pacific character of their institutions can exempt them from the ordinary lot of nations."†

There is, therefore, necessity for an ever-present exhibition of the power of the Government, visibly capable of development to meet any probable demand upon it. The Army and the Navy are the *embodiment of this power*, and our military strength is measured by the available land and naval forces at our command. Our situation in one sense is as insular as Great Britain, and the policy which has placed her at the head of the naval and commercial world should, to a great extent, be our own.

As an efficient guard against attack by foreign foe, as a visible token of our power abroad, as protector and aid to our commerce, and a means of maintaining any foreign policy save one of "supine submission," a powerful Navy is indispensable.

Owing to our military insularity, the Navy must ever be our first line of defense, but to be secure in fact we must have back of it a coast defended by strongly fortified harbors and an Army. It is not enough to have at hand abundant material with which to create an Army; we should have a sufficient force always in hand, or the means of quickly creating such a force. In these days nations study their rivals too closely to admit of being deceived by appearances, and to be thought strong a nation must be so in reality.

Our past history has sufficiently proved that our military policy has been both costly and ineffective, and a superstitious dread of a standing army has ever interfered with the creation and maintenance of a force adequate to our needs.

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*John Adams. Annual Message, December 3, 1799.

†Madison. Message of February 18, 1815.

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The Republic was born in the throes of war, and the necessities of the conflict alone produced the Continentals, the Regulars of the Revolution. Drilled and organized by Steuben, who had served on the staff of Frederic the Great, the Continentals became efficient troops, and by them mainly our independence was won. They were, even during the continuance of active hostilities, the objects of jealous watchfulness and timid legislation, despite an experience which repeatedly proved that no other troops could be depended upon. "Experience," wrote Washington, "which is the best criterion to work by, so fully, so clearly and so decisively reprobates the practice of trusting to militia, that no man who regards order, regularity and economy, or his honor, character or peace of mind, will risk them upon this issue. The evils to be apprehended from a standing army are remote, and situated as we are, not at all to be dreaded, but the consequence of wanting one is certain and inevitable ruin."

A dislike and a distrust of a standing army were manifest in the earliest days of our national life, and at the close of the war the Continentals were disbanded, with the exception of 700 men, who were detained to guard public property and occupy forts vacated by the British.

The articles of confederation prohibited any State from keeping up any body of forces in time of peace, except such as Congress should deem requisite to garrison the forts necessary for the defense of the State. The constitutions of six of the thirteen States assumed as an axiom, that "standing armies are dangerous to liberty." Perhaps the most strenuous opposition to any part of our present constitution was directed against the paragraph which gives power to the Congress to raise and support armies, although it was further provided that no appropriations for that use should be for a longer term than two years. Even with this safeguard it was thought necessary to adopt further amendments, born of the same spirit, that the right of the people to keep and bear arms should not be infringed; and that in time of peace no soldier should be quartered in any honse without the con-

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sent of the owner, nor in time of war but in the manner prescribed by law.

It had been found that the country could not dispense with a small, permanent force, and one of the first acts of the new government, on the adoption of the Constitution, was to organize the 700 men retained in service into four companies of artillery and eight companies of infantry. By the act of September 29, 1789, "these were recognized to be the establishment for the troops in the service of the United States," and it became thus the standing army. From that date to this it has existed as an essential part of our Government; it has existed only because of its absolute necessity in preserving our institutions. Whatever else a nation has done without, none has ever been able to dispense with a military force.

We have not proved an exception to the rule. Our little force was first required mainly as a defense against the incursions of savage Indians upon the frontier settlements, but the imminent danger of war with France brought to the people a realization of their unprepared condition, and a conviction that "an efficient preparation for war can alone insure peace." * Men with experience in war pleaded with their countrymen to adopt proper means for defense. "We shall be told that the militia of the country is its national bulwark, and would be at all times equal to the national defense. This doctrine in substance had like to have lost our independence. It cost millions to the United States that might have been saved. The facts which, from our own experience, forbid a reliance of this kind are too recent to permit us to be the dupes of such a suggestion. The steady operations of war against a regular and disciplined army can only be successfully conducted by a force of the same kind. Considerations of economy not less than of stability and vigor confirm this position. * * * War, like most other things, is a science to be acquired and perfected by diligence, by perseverence, by time and practice." †

"However pacific the general policy of a nation may be, it ought never to be without an adequate stock of military

* John Adams. Annual Message, 1798.

† Hamilton, in the Federalist XXV.

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knowledge for emergencies. * * * In proportion as the observance of pacific maxims might exempt a nation from the necessity of practicing the rules of the military art, ought to be its care in preserving and transmitting by proper establishments, the knowledge of that art. Whatever argument may be drawn from particular examples superficially reviewed, a thorough examination of the subject will evince that the art of war is extensive and complicated; that it demands much previous study; that the possession of it in its most approved and perfect state is always of great moment to the security of a nation." *

"No sentiment can be more just than this: that in proportion as the circumstances and policy of a people are opposed to the maintenance of a large military force, it is important that as much perfection as possible be given to that which may at any time exist. * * * The safety of the country further requires that it should have military institutions capable of perpetuating the art of war, and of furnishing the means for forming a new and large army fit for service in the shortest time possible, and at the least practicable expense to the state." †

"Experience demonstrates that a certain degree of preparation for war is not only indispensable to avert disaster at the outset, but affords also the best security for the continuance of peace. The wisdom of Congress will, therefore, I am confident, provide for the maintenance of a regular force; * * * and for cultivating the military art in all its essential branches under the liberal patronage of the Government." §

By the logic of such words, and perhaps still more by the logic of events which threatened the safety of our country, the people were convinced, and an army, though small and inadequate, has ever been maintained by them.

Cherished in time of danger, contemned in time of peace,

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* Washington. Message, December, 1796.

† McHenry. Secretary of War, 1800.

§ Madison. Message of February 18, 1815.

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it has been increased or diminished as the necessity for its existence has been impressed on the public mind by temporary conditions. It has been a barometer whose curve of rise and fall indicates the storms and calms which our Ship of State has encountered in its voyage on the ocean of Time.

Despite neglect in peace, and ill-judged increase in war, the history of the Regular Army excites our admiration and pride. It achieved independence for us in the Revolution. In the War of 1812, Wellington's veterans of the Peninsula were forced to fly before our Regulars; and at every point they bore themselves with conspicuous gallantry. Not in all history can be found examples of more brilliant and steadfast bravery than they displayed in the Florida War. In Mexico they formed a large percentage of the fighting force. The enemy's capital was taken after the most brilliant conflict recorded in our military annals, without the loss of a skirmish or battle; a result attributed by General Scott to the services of the Regular Army officers. In the Rebellion, the Regular Army as a distinct body was lost in the vast armies of the war, but the gallantry of its officers was attested on every field, and their names will endure as long as we have a country to cherish the memory of its heroes. They have abundantly proved that the American trained to arms has no superior in the world.

The traditional animosity toward the Army still, however, retains its hold on the popular mind, and has influenced all military legislation to the present time. At this day, few political maxims are oftener repeated than that a standing army is a menace to liberty, and to the rights of the people. The dictum is doubtless accepted by many without due inquiry. That our Standing Army is, or ever has been, in any sense a menace to liberty, to the people, or to our institutions, is abundantly disproved by its history. In fact, by it our liberties were won, and to it their preservation and extension are chiefly due. Our Army, meaning its officers and leaders, even more than its enlisted strength, is of the people, and represents the people in all their varied political and social conditions. The House of Representatives is not

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more truly representative of the people than is the Regular Army of the United States. It is composed of men educated in the highest ideals of patriotism, and sworn to uphold our institutions. Its danger to the people has been repeatedly disproved by the arguments of Washington, Hamilton and others, while history has confirmed the justice of their reasoning.

The mission of the Regular Army is clearly outlined in the *Federalist*, and in the writings of our early statesmen.

It was intended as a measure of preparation for war, and as an institution to preserve, transmit and keep pace with progress in the military science and art; and furnish the means of economically forming larger armies in the shortest time possible. It is in peace a practical school of instruction for officers who, when occasion arises, are to disseminate their knowledge as widely as possible among the untrained levies which would constitute our improvised war armies; they are the leaven which must leaven the whole loaf. The Army is not, therefore, an organization foreign to our institutions. It is one of them, and an essential one, upon which the stability of all the others has in the past depended, and may depend again.

The use of the Army to keep Indians at peace and to suppress occasional riots is purely secondary and incidental. With the gradual settling of the West, the Indians will come under the ordinary operation of the civil law; and although in brief outbursts of lawlessness, in cities or elsewhere, the Army may be called upon to protect government property or to restore order, its use should be confined to cases of instant and imperious necessity, where the application of physical force alone is capable of effecting the end desired. The Army should not be used against the people; it is their creature, and their means of protection from foreign foes. Local disturbances, however, if they arise, must involve but few of the people, for they are caused by discontent with the existing order of things, and this order is in the hands of the people themselves. The revolutions of our country are accomplished by the ballot; the physical and moral power of

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the majority is sure to triumph over lawlessness, and, in the end, to lend ear to every just complaint.

Having ascertained the special mission of the Army, it is proper to inquire how far it fulfills its functions.

As a school of instruction for officers, the Military Academy at West Point is unsurpassed in laying a proper foundation for their education. The Schools of Application for the several branches of the service at Willet's Point, Forts Monroe and Leavenworth, are excellent for their purpose. The soldier life of the frontier affords practical instruction of the highest value. There is, however, a lack of practical work by the several arms united; lack of practice in directing large bodies; lack of practice in many essential details of war. Abroad our officers are rated among the highest; but they are in many respects theoretical soldiers only. They perform, however, to the full extent of their opportunities, the part assigned to them.

As a means of quickly raising larger armies, the Army is but ill adapted. It numbers but 25,000 men, organized into twenty-five regiments of infantry, ten of cavalry, five of artillery, and a battalion of engineers. On a peace footing the companies average about fifty men each, and by the plan of expansion which seems to have been adopted for us, that of doubling the peace footing, we would derive from the Regular Army a force of 50,000 men, one-half of whom naturally would be untrained in service, but who would quickly become serviceable by reason of association with old soldiers. The Army has no organization for war; it is in fact not an Army, but a collection of regiments, few of which are united, the greater part being scattered in detachments throughout the country where their presence is most necessary. It is doubtful whether a division of 15,000 Regulars could be assembled from the entire Army, and even this could not be done without stripping important points of their needed guard. It is certain that under existing conditions the Army as an organization would play but a small part in a war of any magnitude. In the Revolution we mustered about 250,000 men; in the War of 1812, more than 500,000; in the Mexican War, requiring

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fewer troops because it was purely a war of invasion, we had about 102,000 men under arms; and in the Rebellion we numbered 2,778,304 soldiers, about one-half of whom were in service at the close of the war. In any war of defense against a naval power, with the consequent necessity of guarding all important points of our immense sea coast and frontier, duly considering their extent on one hand, and on the other our facilities for concentrating and transporting troops by water and rail on interior lines, a low estimate would place our needed force at 500,000 men. It is clear that as an organization the Regular Army could by no means furnish us with a sufficient force, nor could it even be the nucleus upon which as a basis a sufficient force could be formed. We should be compelled to look elsewhere for our armies.

Formerly, our military strength was popularly supposed to reside in a "well regulated militia," which was deemed "necessary to the security of a free State." This was the popular belief. It was by no means shared by the men whose experience had made them capable of gauging the true value of ill-trained soldiery. With the growing population and wealth of the nation the people pleased themselves with the fancy that numbers and arms, not training and organization, were the essentials of an efficient Army. The fields of Brandywine, Germantown, Camden, Cowpens and Guilford Court House all proclaimed the worthlessness of militia. As we have seen, Hamilton affirmed that faith in the militia "had like to have lost us our independence." Washington, in a letter to Congress, asserted that "if called upon to declare upon oath whether the militia had been most serviceable or hurtful on the whole, he should subscribe to the latter." Another Revolutionary veteran, General Huntington, declared: "Let the Government proceed to regulate the militia to the utmost length their masters, the sovereign people, will bear. It will be just so far as to make them food for powder in the day of battle; and death, or what is worse, loss of honor, must be expected by every officer of spirit connected with them."

The people, however, still clung to their belief. A repe-

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tition of the lessons of the Revolution was needed to shake their faith in their idol. They received it in the War of 1812, in which civilian generals and militia were everywhere beaten. The humiliating reverses of the war were without exception due to the misconduct of militia. With more than half a million of men in arms our Capital was captured and burned by 4,000 British troops, who were directly opposed by nearly double their number of militia. In the Florida War the militia again entered the field, to its own dishonor and the national loss. The lesson was learned at last, and in spite of the prejudice in its favor the idea of defending our country with untrained militia has been definitely abandoned. It is not to militia that we must trust our defense.

In the War of 1812 was inaugurated the system of raising volunteer organizations on the model of the Regular troops, drilled in their tactics, and governed by their regulations. In the school of actual war they soon became Regulars in all essential points, and with the Regulars they have fought and won the battles of the Republic. In 1812 their victories redeemed the disgraceful defeats of the militia; and in Mexico they shared the honors of the Regulars. By their valor and devotion the Rebellion was suppressed, and on their proven worth do we now rely for our defense in the hour of need. The world, perhaps, has never seen more efficient armies than those which wheeled through the streets of Washington in the grand review of 1865; armies composed of soldiers, "in comparison with whom the most seasoned veteran of Europe was but a raw recruit."

Still, it is needful to look upon another side of this glittering picture of power. Four years of costly sacrifice, four years of schooling in a fierce and sanguinary war was required to develop those splendid armies. It has been said of the Rebellion that its history "is a record of pluck and mismanagement," in which we were fortunate in having to cope with a foe even less prepared than we were ourselves. A political Government, we must expect that political considerations will greatly influence our policy. In the early days of the war many appointments of Generals were made

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purely on a political basis. Officers without fitness for command were elected by their own men. The men themselves, loyal and gallant as they were, required months, even years, of service before they realized the necessity of discipline, or would submit to it.

Experience, at all times a stern teacher, is nowhere more terribly so than in war. The disasters resulting from the blunders of ignorance were fearfully wasteful of blood and treasure, and, taught by such lessons, a better system began to prevail. Incompetent Generals were superseded by others whose ability to command was developed and demonstrated by actual service; incapable officers of lower grades were weeded out by thousands, and their places filled by men whose gallantry had been proved upon the battlefield. By this slow process were evolved the volunteer armies of the North, unsurpassed in their final might, but a growth of time, during which we suffered repeated disaster and were called upon to offer on the altar of country the most tremendous sacrifices of men and money the world has ever seen.

In the South, officers were selected with greater care, and to this fact is largely due the early successes of the Confederates; but her armies, likewise, suffered from incompetent officers and lack of discipline.

The volunteer armies were disbanded at the close of the conflict, and their veterans carried a knowledge of war with them into all parts of the land. Speaking from an experience which none might gainsay, they taught that preparation was necessary in war; that neither soldiers nor armies could be improvised at a moment's notice, and in nearly all of the Northern States, born of their counsels, there has sprung up the "National Guard," or organized militia. These troops are very different from the militia of olden days; they are organized and drilled generally on the model of the Regular Army, and are, in fact, State armies. While they owe allegiance primarily to the State, these organizations tend greatly to augment our military strength by affording to a portion of the people, elementary ideas at least of military service and discipline.

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The total number of the National Guard is about 110,000. Some are excellent troops; others are very inefficient. Many would undoubtedly do good service in war, but a serious doubt may be permitted that all will prove either available or useful. Too many of these organizations are looked upon as clubs, where uniforms make a pleasing addition to social entertainments, and where an occasional parade is the most exacting duty required of the members. Considered as a whole, the National Guard may be depended upon to furnish many fully equipped and well drilled regiments. They would prove deficient generally in staff service and in knowledge of field duties. They are widely scattered, but if concentrated they would probably in a short time make two good corps so far as infantry is concerned.

Taking this number and the available portion of the Regular Army placed on a war footing, we would have 110,000 men, or about one-fifth of the required force. Could we utilize the entire Regular Army on a similar footing, our total would be but 130,000, a quarter only of the number necessary. We would at the same time have exhausted the organized strength of the country unless, to eke out our numbers, we count upon the Knights of Pythias and other similar organizations which make a feature of military drill. They are comparatively few in numbers and their drill insufficient, but having become in some degree accustomed to discipline, they would prove a valuable addition to our forces. We should, therefore, for at least two-thirds of our armies, be compelled to depend on raw troops, and with the military knowledge of the country largely absorbed by the other third, their chance of becoming efficient would be slight indeed. Such is the system upon which we depend for our defense. The conclusion seems irresistible that our preparation is insufficient. In case of war we would, as we have done hitherto, suffer early disasters and great loss of life and treasure before we could meet our foe on nearly equal terms; for a time we would be at the mercy of any well prepared enemy. Though we would never submit to defeat, we would purchase final victory at fearful cost.

In modern war the value of the initiative is so great that

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upon it often depends the issue of the struggle. The costly preparations of European nations are made chiefly with a view of securing it. By its aid Prussia, in 1866 and 1870, in brief campaigns, overcame what were seemingly the most powerful nations of Europe. Japan, in similar way, quickly brought to terms a nation of ten times her own strength in population and wealth. Numbers and boundless resources form no sufficient obstacle to organization and preparation. Our lack of preparation will give our opponents the initiative and its advantages, not least of which is that of carrying the war into the enemy's territory. Whenever we wish to attack, being ourselves unready, we must perforce allow our opponent an equal time to prepare to meet us. In defense, we are still worse off; we must meet our already prepared enemy with raw levies and imperfect organization. We shall be fortunate if he does not inflict great damage upon us before we can oppose him with a fairly efficient force. Competent judges have declared that it required at least a year to transform our volunteer levies into efficient soldiers; allowing for superior intelligence in our people, it would, at the best, take months to get our troops in fit condition to trust them in battle. The trained craftsman does better work than the novice, and a disciplined army is more efficient than raw troops, no matter how brave or enthusiastic. There can be no doubt that the simplest, and in the end the most economical, remedy for these evils is the constant maintenance of an adequate Regular Army. This remedy is not likely to be applied. Legislation concerning the Army seems to be controlled by a misapprehension of its true functions; to a certain extent also by the traditional jealousy of a Standing Army; by a spirit of false economy; by the idea that we do not need a large peace establishment, and by the belief in the efficacy of hastily improvised volunteer armies.

All history attests the military folly of such systems as ours; our isolation alone has saved us. In Europe, frequently repeated experience has taught nations the necessity of constant preparation in order to preserve their national life. The entire able-bodied male population, with few exceptions, is trained for war, and their standing armies are kept up to

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the highest attainable point of efficiency in numbers and discipline.*

Our national existence is not so constantly threatened as theirs; our insular position and the difficulty of transporting troops by sea, are reasons sufficient to allay apprehension of sudden invasion by any considerable force. England alone occupies an advantageous position for invading our soil, and with her we have not apprehended war. We do not, therefore, need a large standing army, but we do need one large enough to accomplish the purposes for which it was created and for which it is maintained.

Our present force is too small to do this. It calls for but one man to every three thousand of population. We could increase the Army many times over before it would be felt as a burden upon the people, and even this the patriotism of the people would willingly endure were the necessity for such an increase ever to arise. Happily, of this there is no question, but merely of such an increase as would ensure a real usefulness when needed. It is to be feared that the necessity of any increase will not be realized until disaster again teaches the lesson. "The experience of past faults," says Gibbon, "which may sometimes correct the mature age of an individual, is seldom profitable to the successive generations of mankind." The veterans of the Revolution pleaded the cause of a Regular Army, but 1812 found us unprepared. The survivors of that war took up the note of warning and entreaty. They too passed on, and the Rebellion found us again unready. Now a younger generation is springing up, imbued with traditions of the glory of those wars, but un-

*The following table shows the number of regular forces kept constantly on foot during time of peace, and the number of *trained soldiers*, exclusive of militia, that will constitute the first war armies of European powers:

Country.	*Peace Footing.*	*War Footing.*
Austria	349,000	2,686,000
England	369,000	817,000
France	525,000	2 930 000
Germany	585,000	3,700,000
Italy	276,000	2,607,000
Russia	910,000	3,136,000

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taught in their disasters, their cost in blood, and treasure, and suffering, most of which could have been spared the country if the words of the fathers had been heeded.

If it be resolved to dispense with an Army large enough to insure our protection, the least we can do in reason would seem to be to maintain the nucleus of a force capable of due expansion in time of need. The existing establishment does not answer this requirement, although in it a slight recognition is made of the principle, in making some arms disproportionately large. In infantry, to which all other arms are auxiliary, we are most deficient.

Let us determine in a general way, an organization and scheme of expansion for a minimum peace Army which would give us the force we should require in war. Assuming that we shall need five hundred thousand soldiers in a defensive war with any naval power, we may base our estimate on the formation of three separate armies, each 100,000 strong, for independent action in the East, South and West, utilizing the remainder for coast and frontier defense. For this we should need:

Of Infantry, about	430,000
Of Cavalry, about	40,000
Of Artillery, about	30,000
Total	500,000

We will first consider the infantry. Its present organization is antiquated. It is abandoned now by every nation except the United States and China. It has been condemned by successive commanding and other generals of the Army for twenty-five years; General Sherman said it was "awkward in practice"; it is, moreover, impossible to expand it beyond certain small limits. For a quarter of a century, our generals have besought Congress to adopt the three battalion organization for the infantry. The tactical advantages of the proposed organization are great, but will be assumed as established by the fact that they have caused its general adoption by all civilized nations except our own, and by the authority of the names of Sherman, Sheridan, Schofield, Crook, Miles, and others who have urged its adoption. Our

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drill books prescribe the maneuvers of such battalions, but we still maintain the old infantry organization, the other arms already having the three battalion regiment.

Leaving aside the discussion of the three battalion regiment as regards tactics, it is well to call attention to another advantage, most important to us, namely, its great elasticity and capability of expansion. The great body of every Army is composed of infantry. We shall want good infantry everywhere, and a great deal of it.

Were our existing regiments made to consist of three battalions each, and their enlisted strength increased correspondingly, our condition would be very greatly improved. Our twenty-five regiments, with 120 men to a company, would give 36,000 infantry. If need be, with this organization, companies could be increased to a strength of 250 men without requiring any change in tactical methods, and we would have practically the organization existing in the German army. Our infantry could at once be raised to a force of 75,000 men, which, in connection with other arms, would make a respectable army for emergencies.

For a war of magnitude requiring a greater expansion of our forces, another plan would have to be resorted to. The highest military authorities of our country * agree in making an army consist of three corps, each corps of three divisions, each division of three brigades, and each of these of three regiments. If the regiments be of three battalions, we can produce a large force from a comparatively small basis, by expanding each battalion to the size of a regiment; each regiment then becomes a brigade, each brigade a division, and so on.

The officers of a battalion of four companies are a Major, four Captains, and eight Lieutenants. In the new regiment:

1 Major becomes Colonel.

1 Captain becomes Lieutenant-Colonel.

3 Captains become Majors.

8 Lieutenants become Captains.

There would still be lacking four Captains and twenty-six Lieutenants. These could be supplied from graduates of

* See particularly Sherman's Memoirs, Vol. II, page 385.

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colleges which include military instruction in their courses, and by the promotion of deserving non-commissioned officers. The companies having civilian Captains are to be assigned, so far as practicable, to different battalions.

By this plan every organization would be commanded by officers familiar with their tactical duties. The civilian appointments would be in the lowest grades, where inexperience would be likely to work the least injury. Association with older officers, and field service, would soon teach them their administrative and other duties.

The peace strength of the battalion, on the present average basis of fifty men to a company, would be about two hundred men. These should be divided equally among the new companies, where they would make non-commissioned officers and squad leaders. A good captain with a few veteran soldiers in a new company would quickly bring it up to a fair standard of efficiency.

With experienced officers in all grades from captain up; with educated subalterns who had, to some extent, been trained to arms; with experienced men for non-commissioned officers, and a leaven of old soldiers in every company, this would seem to be the best way of creating an effective infantry in a short time.

By such a plan we would avoid the errors and disasters of the past, due to giving high commands to inexperienced leaders, and we would utilize to its fullest extent the military knowledge in the country. It would obviate the necessity of our evasion of the constitutional provision against the maintenance of State armies under the name of the National Guard, and the money now expended on it, both by the States severally and by the United States, could be better and more economically expended in creating new regiments in the regular force. Though few or no civilians would enter upon untried functions with high rank, two-thirds of the officers of the national forces would be drawn direct from the people. There would be ample scope for military talent to manifest itself and for merit to rise, for in war the survival of the fittest must be the rule vital to success. The most eminent generals drawn from civil life during the Rebellion

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rose usually from the subordinate grades, and the present commander of the Regular Army entered the volunteer service as a Captain. With our present twenty-five regiments reorganized on a three battalion basis, we could, by this scheme of expansion, obtain a force of 108,000 infantry, most of which could be made available for immediate use, and it would surely be a far more efficient force than if raised from entirely new levies officered in the old way.

With ninety-five regiments — 59,000 enlisted strength in peace — we could raise the 430,000 infantry required for war. With ten regiments of cavalry — 7,200 enlisted peace strength — we could raise 40,000 cavalry; it would be judicious to increase the peace footing of cavalry to say double the present number on account of the difficulty of speedily training men for this service. The peace footing of this arm would then be twenty regiments, 14,400 strong.

Of artillery we should require seventy-two light batteries for the armies in the field. We have sixty, including both heavy and light, with a total of 275 officers. The system of rotation in service, alternately with heavy and light artillery, would give us the requisite number of officers who had served with the latter, but it is certain that many of them could not enter a campaign where young and active men are required.

Three new regiments of light artillery, each of twelve batteries, and the changing of one of the existing regiments into light artillery, would give us a total peace footing of forty-eight light batteries with an enlisted strength of about 3,000 men. By expansion this would give 220 officers, sufficient to afford a commander and two chiefs of platoons for each of the seventy-two batteries required, and about 13,000 enlisted strength. The four remaining regiments of heavy artillery expanded on the same principle as the infantry, with a peace footing of about 2,000, would afford 17,280 men.

It would also seem wise to merge the ordnance corps and the heavy artillery into one body, and consider the light artillery as a special arm. The whole artillery corps so reorganized should be under a common Chief of Artillery.

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Officers should be transferred from one branch of the artillery service to another, according to individual aptitude.

By considering the capability for expansion of each arm, we would thus obtain a relative peace and war footing shown in the following table:

	Peace Footing.	*War Footing.*
Infantry	59,000	430,000
Cavalry	14,400	40,000
Artillery (light)	3,000	13,000
Artillery (heavy)	2,000	17,000
	78,400	500,000

The number of men required for such a peace establishment would be but about one to every one thousand of our population, far less in proportion than is required for the police force of our large cities, as will be seen by the following table:

City.	*Population.*	*Police Force.*	*Proportion.*
Boston	448,000	1,109	1 to 404
Brooklyn	806,000	1,755	1 to 459
Chicago	1,100,000	3,269	1 to 336
New York	1,515,000	3,806	1 to 398
Philadelphia	1,047,000	2,451	1 to 427
Total	4,916,000	12,390	1 to 396

These five cities alone support a regular police force equal in numbers to about one-half the Regular Army. The drain on the population is between two and three times as great as it would be in the proposed peace establishment; the money for the support of the police force is freely expended, the only requirements being that it shall be efficient, and no appropriation wasted. The National establishment has greater interests to protect, and should, if maintained at all, be kept in condition to make it efficient for its purposes. The cost of maintaining an Army decreases relatively as its numbers are increased; with an Army having the numbers and or-

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ganization proposed, we would have as near an approach to a state of complete preparation as we may ever hope to get in this country, and in case of war we would, in a short time, be able to cope with any enemy whatever, on terms that would give reasonable hope of success from the outset. It would seem to fulfill the requirements stated by Adams as "a system of national defense commensurate with our resources and the situation of our country"; and while still the smallest peace establishment of any great nation on earth, insignificant, indeed, compared with those of any great European power, we should have the means of providing, with certainty and expedition, armies equal to any probable emergency.

As a peace establishment simply, the Army has practically no reason for existence, if we except frontier service against Indians and occasional riots, which in short time would be controlled by the people themselves. An army is a body of men armed, trained and organized for war, and for war alone; in time of peace its duty is simply to prepare for war. To this end it should devote all its energies. It should be maintained in the highest state of efficiency as regards organization and discipline; it should study the military needs of the country, and strive to meet them; it should disseminate a knowledge of military art as widely as possible among our citizens as long as it remains simply a nucleus. These are its occupations during peace. Our subject requires a somewhat more detailed examination of this point.

The efficiency of an army is a direct function of the quality of its officers. "A good Captain makes a good company." It is expected, as a matter of course, that enlisted men under good officers shall be efficient. Their duties are simple, and may be learned in a comparatively short time. They are not likely to be more than an insignificant fractional part of our war forces. As a matter of fact, our army exists mainly as a practical school of instruction for its officers. In all vital points, it may be said that they are the army. We depend upon their skill and knowledge for the direction of our wars. In the past they have come to the front as leaders, and to them we shall look for the generals

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of the future. The value to the country of educated army officers is attested on every field since we have had a Military Academy. General Scott gave it "as his fixed opinion that but for our graduated cadets, the war between the United States and Mexico might, and probably would, have lasted some four or five years with, in its first half, more defeats than victories falling to our share; whereas in less than two campaigns we conquered a great country and a peace without the loss of a single battle or skirmish."

The volunteer armies of the Rebellion could never have been organized or drilled but for the technical knowledge of our regular officers. Their text books on military art were often the only instructors that volunteer officers were able to secure.

It is meet then that the theoretical knowledge and practical skill of our officers be developed to the fullest extent possible.

As already noted, our officers have little to desire in the way of theoretical instruction. As regards practice there is much to be desired. Military efficiency is a matter more of habit than of courage or patriotism. It follows that all exercises should be carried on, as nearly as may be, under the same conditions that obtain in war, with the same organizations and the same number of men in them. Drill should comprise as large bodies as possible, and be carried on over ground of varied topography, and of sufficient extent to enable all the essential operations of war to be illustrated upon it. Only in this way can correct habits of thought and action be acquired; only in this way can officers be made more than theoretical students of the art of war. They may know the science thoroughly, but practice is essential to the requirement of any art. It is practice, and the confidence bestowed by a broad knowledge of his profession which makes the soldier as well as the lawyer, the engineer, or the surgeon.

Regular officers are expected to take high commands in war, but under existing conditions war would find the majority occupying subordinate positions, held so long as to unfit the occupants for high command, and unprepared to fulfill its

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duties. The best would need to get accustomed to their new stations, gaining experience when they should be applying its lessons. The awkwardness and the confusion of our maneuvers in the early days of the Rebellion the Count of Paris attributes to our having no officers accustomed to handle large bodies of troops. That they speedily grew to their commands, he thought was due to the responsible positions often held by even junior officers in frontier service. With the present system of concentration, this advantage is passing away, and for the future there seems to be an imperative need of some system by which officers may receive suitable practice in their art. The only means of accomplishing this in time of peace is that adopted in Europe, where practical field exercises are carried out with so much earnestness that an Austrian Lieutenant-General may lose his commission by making a tactical error on a mock field of battle.

In this country it would be impracticable to attempt field maneuvers on a European scale. It would seem possible, however, to have one or more tracts of country sufficiently large for the purpose reserved to the United States for such exercises. As the need of scattering troops on the frontier grows less, a brigade, or better, a division, could be concentrated in permanent quarters on such reservations, regiments being stationed there by detail, as they are now at other posts. At such a post could be located the Schools of Application for the several arms of the service, and theory and practice would go hand in hand to complete and perfect the officer's education.

For purposes of drill, organizations could be placed on a war footing by temporary consolidations of commands, and just conceptions obtained of the true relations of the several organizations to the ground they should cover in actual war. Officers should be in turn assigned to commands above their grade, and thus become familiar with their duties in an expanded army. A certain part of each year could be spent in the field; the different arms by maneuvering together would learn their respective duties on the march and in battle.

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Regimental concentration, the policy adopted in recent years, is in many respects an excellent thing, but its advantages are slight compared with those resulting from the concentration of large mixed commands. It is perfectly practicable to carry the principle to larger organizations than regiments, while as a measure of economy its advantages are obvious; besides the real military proficiency attained, the cost of maintaining such a post would be much less than that of keeping up the several posts, into which otherwise the regiments must be distributed.

At the remaining smaller posts, the routine of garrison life must continue as at present, the commands being kept in readiness for the varied secondary uses to which the army, or any part of it, may be applied.

The foregoing remarks apply especially to the infantry, cavalry and light artillery. The engineers and heavy artillery have their Schools of Application at Willet's Point and Fort Monroe, points well adapted to their purpose. It would be advisable to have a portion of the engineer battalion stationed at the large posts, to enable them to acquire facility in the performance of their duties in connection with troops in campaign, and to afford officers of other arms an opportunity to learn what aid they may expect of the engineer corps in the field. Young engineers should be detailed for a year's course in such practical work, which would be of great benefit to them in many ways. The remainder of the corps should find sufficient employment in devising and constructing fortifications on our seacoasts and at other exposed points, and in developing our torpedo service.

The heavy artillery, stationed at these works, which of course should be provided with proper armament of modern guns, would acquire practical familiarity with their own arm, and would become artillery in fact as well as name. There should be for the benefit of these arms suitable proving grounds, at which all their officers should serve at least two years. With this practical work, inventive genius would find opportunity for development, and individual talent be made available and useful to the service. There can be little doubt that great benefit would result from such a plan, more surely

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than from the present system, in which an artillery officer may grow gray in the service without ever seeing a modern gun.

An army is an exceedingly complex machine, requiring for its successful operation perfection in numberless details. None now attempts more than a mastery of the general principles of the whole art, but in the study of a single specialty may spend the labor of a lifetime. The laws of gravitation are simple; but many and varied, we are told, are their manifestations in nature. So the science of war is simple; it may be summed up in a few general maxims, but their applications are infinite.

Army officers constitute an indispensable body of specialists, and each officer, for the general good of the country, should have opportunity to become theoretically and practically proficient in his special arm.

The science and art of war have made great advances in the past few years. The veteran of the Rebellion would find himself obliged to unlearn and learn again the simplest principles of the art, so much have new arms, new tactics and new methods replaced those of thirty years ago. Scarcely an invention of this inventive age but finds some application in war. Each must be adapted and perfected to such use. To do this, to keep abreast of all scientific advance, and apply it to his special field, to keep himself theoretically and practically proficient in his profession, is the highest duty of the officer. He himself may not have opportunity to risk his life in the Nation's cause, but he preserves, transmits, and adds to the knowledge which may prove his country's salvation. It is doubtless a noble career, but to the officer it usually means a life of self-sacrifice and devotion. For the most part he is doomed to study and labor in obscurity. Compared with civil pursuits his pay is meager, his life one of hardship and privation. In peace his reward is the consciousness of duty well done; in war it is too likely that political exigencies will place him under commanders drawn from civil life, who must depend on his technical skill to enhance their reputation and promote their political ambitions at home. Such has been his experience in the past, and such will probably be the history of the future. In

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a political government everything must give way before political considerations, and military success is said to be the shortest road to political preferment. Such policy we believe to be unwise; however distinguished as politicians, lawyers, legislators or statesmen, civilians as a rule have been failures as generals in the field. The civilians who rose to eminence as commanders in the Rebellion were those who by experience in lower grades, and by their own study, acquired technical knowledge in the actual school of war.

Another duty of the officer in time of peace has been referred to, namely, the dissemination of military knowledge. As in a political and representative government every citizen should to a certain extent be a lawyer, so also in a government whose military forces are drawn from the people at large, should every citizen be a soldier. As a means to this end none is more important than the education of college students in the elementary principles of discipline and drill, and in general notions of the science and art of war. The detail of army officers as instructors at colleges is based on the broadest and soundest principles of national policy. Such instruction is of benefit both to the country and to the student. In case of war the former would find men for educated officers, and the student at any rate has had a good physical training, has acquired the habits of discipline, and the knowledge of its necessity. The effect of such instruction is not necessarily to "foster a military spirit in the land," but to enable the young citizen to perform his duty to his country should her institutions be imperiled by foreign or domestic foe. Officers can hardly be employed in a better way than this. Their duties at colleges are, in nine cases out of ten, much more important than those they would find when serving with their companies. Long service in subordinate grades unfits officers for high commands; it tends to narrow them and to diminish their usefulness. The college detail is a spur to industry, and is beneficial to the officer in a high degree. He meets and learns to know the people, and becomes known of them—in itself a thing greatly to be desired. It were none too many if every college in the land had an officer detailed as military instructor.

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Officers should be selected for this duty from the smaller posts of the army, as it should be a rule that none should be ordered on a long detail when his regiment is at a brigade or division post.

The faults of the army as regards preparation for war do not lie at its own door. In its sphere it has done all it is capable of doing. The remedies must come from the civil power, whose servant the army must ever be. The most vital defects have already been indicated, and would seem that legislation were needed on these lines: the infantry and artillery should be reorganized, the infantry on a three battalion, the artillery on a corps basis, and all arms should be increased. If it be deemed inadvisable to make the increase at once, the new regiments could be added gradually until the desired number be obtained. Beyond the figures given there would probably never be call to go, unless there should be a radical change in our military policy brought about by the establishment of powerful and hostile neighbors at our doors.

Appropriations should also be made for the establishment of at least one large post on the plan described above. Until some such measures are adopted, we are unprepared for war; only by their adoption may the army be enabled to fulfill its mission as outlined by the founders of our government. The expense involved would be light in comparison to the value of the insurance obtained. It would have been economy had we adopted them in the past; it would be economy to adopt them now.

Our interests lie in the preservation of peace and in the cultivation of its arts; a peaceful people, we have ever courted peace by every means consistent with honor; a high-spirited people, we have ever chosen war rather than submission to insult or invasion of our rights.

As no man can tell when the soldier may again be in demand, it would seem that prudence, economy, and common sense, unite in dictating an adequate preparation, which alone can give us "a rational prospect of escaping the calamities of war or national degradation."

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
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